yacht yogi sinking

• THE PRINCESS PASSPORT
• Email Newsletter
• Yacht Walkthroughs
• Destinations
• Electronics
• Boating Safety

What Sank the Superyacht Yogi?

• By Kim Kavin
• Updated: March 25, 2013

yogi-running2-high-res-fin.jpg

In February 2012, the yachting industry was shocked to learn that the acclaimed 197-foot Proteksan-Turquoise Yogi had sunk in the Aegean Sea. She was barely a year old and still collecting awards for her design and craftsmanship, and then suddenly, she was gone.

Now, about a year later, the French Bureau d’Enquêtes sur les Évènements de Mer—also known as BEAmer—has released its 40-page report about the sinking. The report concludes that three aft compartments aboard Yogi flooded, causing the vessel to become unstable and sink. However, the report fails to pinpoint a cause of the flooding.

The report does hint at a possible problem with Yogi ‘s stern door, noting that the door seal had been replaced to make it “a more appropriate color.” Other work in that section of the yacht had included removing and re-installing the stern door to refit chests that held the swim ladders.

The report also states that originally requested warranty work had included addressing crew complaints about overall instability when Yogi was at sea, and that Yogi had a different superstructure than her sisterships, one that raised her center of gravity. The report’s conclusions urge naval architects and designers to “ban architectural options that pose risks for vessel safety,” but stop short of calling Yogi an unstable design.

Following the release of the BEAmer report, Mehmet Karabeyoglu, managing director at Proteksan-Turquoise, issued a statement that affirms the report’s conclusion that the shipyard adhered to all rules and regulations during the construction process. However, he criticized the report as “a limp effort” that contained factual inaccuracies. In particular, he noted that Yogi ‘s owner did originally request a new stability-related test, but then withdrew that request, leaving the yard to assume that everything was fine when the yacht was at sea.

“We can only conclude that stability was not an issue, otherwise the captain would not have sailed for months if he had doubts about stability and certainly would not have sailed into poor weather,” Karabeyoglu stated.

The upshot is that finger-pointing and backroom whispers about what sank Yogi is likely to continue for years to come. The yacht remains about 1,600 feet underwater off the coast of Skyros, Greece.

Click here to view photos of Yogi ‘s tragic end.

• More: Motoryachts , Yachting News Headlines , Yachts
• More Yachts

Compass’ New Luxury Limo Tender

Nauta Reveals Details of the XP75

Two Sirena Yachts Are Better Than One

Custom Line 140′ Launches

Valo’s Foiling PWC

Palm Beach Motor Yachts 45 Sedan For Sale

• Digital Edition
• Customer Service
• Privacy Policy
• Email Newsletters
• Cruising World
• Sailing World
• Salt Water Sportsman
• Sport Fishing
• Wakeboarding

Yogi sinking dissected but not proved

A year after the sinking of M/Y Yogi, a new 198-foot (60m) yacht built by Proteksan-Turquoise in Turkey, French investigators have released the report into what happened.

The report by the Bureau d’enquetes sur les evenements de mer (the French Marine Accident Investigation Office, known as BEAmer), carries this caveat: “The analysis of this incident has not been carried out in order to determine or apportion criminal responsibility nor to assess individual or collective liability. Its sole purpose is to identify relevant safety issues and thereby prevent similar accidents in the future.”

Statements from the owner, the shipyard, the classification society, and the flag state authority (France) indicate that the vessel was technically sound and complied with the requirements of the French administration, the report notes.

Still, it sank.

In the early hours of Feb. 17, 2012, M/Y Yogi sank off Skyros Island in the Aegean Sea while en route from Istanbul to Cannes. Its eight crew were rescued. According to the report, here’s what happened:

On Feb. 15, 2012, Yogi sailed from Tuzla, Turkey, to Istanbul for bunkering. As the vessel was not fitted with a stability analysis software, the master carried out the stability calculations on paper. To lighten the vessel and to keep a level trim, the swimming pool tanks were emptied and the DO tanks were left empty, according to Proteksan Turquoise shipyard instructions.

On Feb. 16, the master’s report indicated weather conditions as follows: wind NNW 5-6 with 35-knot gusts. Swell 2-2.50m. Météo France reported wind NE 10-15 knots then NNE 25 knots (30- to 35-knot gusts). Significant wave height between 0.7-1m, sea state slight, then moderate in the western and southwestern part of the basin, reaching 1.3-1.5m after 8 p.m. around Skyros. About 3 a.m., end of the customs inspection and beginning of bunkering (25,000 liters). At 6:15 a.m., getting under way bound to Cannes. At 6:30 p.m., out of Dardanelles straits, pilot dropped. The autopilot setting was 5 degrees maximum rudder angle.The engines were running at 60 percent of the maximum load.

On Feb. 17, about 1:40 a.m., the chief engineer on watch (Chief M1) observed that the starboard engine exhaust expansion ring was split and leaking. As the phone was out of order, he tried to inform the bridge with the interphone but this was defective as well. Chief M1 went up to the bridge and asked the master to stop the starboard engine (there had been no high temperature alarm). At this moment, Chief M2, arrived on the bridge. He closed the two starboard engine exhaust hull valves. At 1:46 a.m., failure confirmation e-mail sent to DPA. The starboard engine was out of service. Soon after, the port engine exhaust and coolant freshwater temperature were also abnormally high. Chief M1 asked the master to slow down; at the same instant the engine automatically shut down. Yogi was stopped and making no way. Starboard broadside to the waves, she was rolling and listing to port. At 2 a.m., the DPA was informed of the second engine failure. The three engineers (the Master Mechanics had also been woken up) undertook the survey of the two seawater suction strainer and of the two engine cooling circuit strainers. The baskets were clean, but it seemed to the engineers that they were frame fit in the chamber without enough clearance and thus the inlet rate of seawater flow was insufficient. The chambers were put back without the baskets, the seawater cross-pipe was bled and the circuit was placed back in service. The service pump circuit (which was feeding the generators) had been set on the propeller shaft stuffing box (max. temp. 35°C, normally cooled by the main engine seawater cooling circuit); but soon after the generators’ coolant pressure was insufficient: back to initial set-up. At 2:20 am, pan-pan alert. About 2:30 a.m., the port engine was restarted and temperatures were back to normal. Chief M2 came to the bridge. When the master clutched in he observed that there was no answer to the helm: the autopilot was off and the two steering engines were “out of order”. The alarm lamps were on and a 30-degree angle to starboard was displayed on the helm angle repeater. In addition he did not succeed in starting the bow thruster. The engineers consider to seal the leak on the starboard exhaust with a thermal blanket (back-up generator insulation) and ratchet straps. Chief M1 and the master mechanics went then aft (without handheld VHF) for a first investigation in the steering room, through the companion hatch on the starboard side of beach club 2: about 15cm of water flooded beach club 2. When they opened the hatch, they observed that the steering room was also partially flooded (30-40cm) without any flooding detection alarm actuation. As the companion hatch was opened, the water was running down from beach club 2 to the steering room and the alarm set off. Chief M1 went back to the engine room and started to pump. The watertight door to access the hi-fog room was then closed by an engineer. The master mechanics went up to the bridge to report to the master and the first officer. The first officer accompanied by the master mechanics (also without hand-held VHF) went to inspect beach club 1 using the outside starboard staircase; taking advantage of a lurch to port, he opened the watertight door, and observed about 1m of water. In order to keep off a route broadside-on to the waves, the engine was kept running dead slow, despite the unavailable helm.

Soon after, the first officer and the master mechanics carried on a second investigation in beach club 1, after they had put on their survival suits. It appeared that the height of water was the same. Due to the tacking, the list shifted to starboard and increased suddenly. Water from the sewage tank flooded the engine room. At 3:25 a.m., DPA in contact with a company in Athens to charter a salvage tug. At 3:40 a.m., the hi-fog room located aft of the engine room was flooded. The draining pumps ran dry. At 3:45 a.m., the Lloyd open form contract was confirmed and the salvage tug went under way. At 4:28 a.m., mayday issued. At 4:40 a.m., last SAT C communication between the vessel and the DPA. About 6 a.m., the crew attempted to reach the liferafts, located on the aft of the sundeck, through the lounge but the two glass windows were blocked closed by the list. The crew did not succeed to break them. The crew found refuge in the superstructure. At 6:43 a.m., the first helicopter cancelled its mission due to a technical failure. At 6:47 a.m., last mobile phone communication between the master and the DPA. At 7:45 a.m., the second helicopter was on task. During the following minutes the stewardess and the rating were winched from the superstructure. Two life rafts were released. As the weather conditions were deteriorating (snow and hail), winching was considered too dangerous. The six other crew members jumped in the water, one after the other, to be winched up. At 8:50 a.m., all crew were in the helicopter bound to Skyros. At 11:04 a.m., the 406 MHz beacon ceased to transmit. Position 38°35.4 N – 025°03.7 E.

Yogi was the third of a three-vessel class built by Proteksan Turquoise shipyard. It was 6.4m longer and differed from the other yachts by a covered sun deck and a hard top. That’s the reason why a 27.9-metric-ton additional keel had been welded to the keel during the build, the report stated. The hull was made of steel and the superstructure of aluminium.

The vessel had two wide access shell doors at the level of the lower deck. The side door on starboard allowed pleasure boat movements from beach club 2. The stern door was used to store two retractable swim ladders. It was accessible from beach club 1. Both doors opened downward and outward. Fitted with joints, they were watertight and weathertight. The locking was done by eight hydraulic jacks fastened on the hull. When closing, if the male part of the jack was not perfectly fit in the door, the locking was impeded and an alarm went off.

Intact stability had been analyzed. An inclining experiment was done on March 17, 2011, in the presence of the local representative of the classification society, who was also the representative of the flag state authority. Damage stability was subjected to several propositions, which were linked to the definition of the watertight compartments proposed by the owner and for which the classification society asked the flag state advice. Indeed, at first, compartment beach club 1 and beach club 2 constituted one compartment (no tightness between the 2 compartments). This arrangement was not compliant to the damage stability criteria.

Watertightness between these compartments had been restored by a watertight hinged door. The compartmentation as well as the watertight doors location was subjected to a new examination after which it had been asked: “Given the type of door fitted between compartment 1 (described as beach club 1) and compartment 2 (described as beach club 2), the damage stability analysis should consider the case when these two compartments are flooded. This door would have to remain closed when the vessel is under way.”

Damage stability had been analyzed. The watertight bulkheads of the vessel should be so arranged that minor hull damage that results in the free flooding of any one compartment will cause the vessel to float at a waterline which, at any point, is not less than 75mm below the weather deck, freeboard deck, or bulkhead deck if not concurrent.

Minor damage should be assumed to occur anywhere in the length of the vessel, but not on a watertight bulkhead.

However, the classification society took into account the flooding of only one beach club and not both. Two months after the delivery, Yogi had a technical call in June 2011 to sort out a problem on the air conditioning system and to repair damages caused by a leak of refrigerant. Some deficiencies noted on the stern door (technical or aesthetic) had been corrected: * repair of hydraulic and electric opening/closing circuits damaged by water infiltrations in the swim ladder stainless chest, and * replacement of the door seal (poorly bonded but tight) by a silicone seal with a more appropriate color. In addition, a 200-liter, two compartment with submersible pumps tank to collect the dripping from the beach clubs had been installed aft of the steering gear in compartment 03. The installation required the modification of the draining circuit. These important modifications, although they affect an installation located under the freeboard deck, do not appear on plans, and the ABS company and the French administration were not informed. The schematic diagram is not part of the approved drawing package. On master’s request (who took command in July 2011), double hose clamps had been fitted on the modified draining circuit connections.

Different works were scheduled during the warranty survey done at the shipyard from October 2011 to February 2012. The major works were to recoat the vessel and to take down the stern door in order to refit the swim ladders chests, and it was necessary to punch the two hinges. The electric connections, the hydraulic spools and the fastening had been renewed. Operations had been monitored by an expert, a naval architect, and tightness tests (passed although the lower part of the stern door had not been tested) had been conducted with fresh water at a pressure of three atmospheres. The tightness had then been checked by the crew during the voyage from Tuzla to Istanbul and from Istanbul to Dardanelles.

However, a projected work list to be done in the frame of the warranty visit shows a specific request linked to the vessel instability (new inclining experiment), problems of submersion of the freeboard marks for some particular loading cases and a request to study an additional VIP cabin.

Loss of stability led to sinking The foundering of the vessel can be explained only by a fast deterioration of the stability, due to a progressive flooding of the three compartments of the aft zone. The gas leak in the starboard engine due to the crazing then cracking of the expansion ring had been preceded by no alarm. BEAmer had been informed of a similar failure on M/Y Petara (the rubber expansion ring, which melted at near 600°C temperature, had been replaced by a metallic ring). As the engineers did not have time to make a temporary repair, the starboard engine was not restarted. The increase of the temperature of the cooling freshwater and of the exhaust in the port engine did not lead to an immediately observable failure of the exhaust expansion ring. The engine shut down automatically, before the master had reduced speed. The engine had been restarted once the cooling seawater circuit had been reset.

The engines were set at 60 percent of maximum load. The sea state and vessel motions did not require to reduce speed. BEAmer does not consider the hypothesis of an air-blocked seawater circuit due to the vessel pitching and rolling. On the other hand, BEAmer considers the hypothesis of an insufficient cooling seawater flow rate, due to strainer basket frame fit in the chamber without enough clearance as an underlying factor contributing to put the vessel in jeopardy. Proteksan Turquoise objects to this hypothesis. (See the builder’s response to this report on page B13.) The cooling temperature thresholds had been exceeded, without the telemonitoring device had allowed the officer to anticipate an “auto shutdown” of the port engine and a major failure of the starboard engine. This malfunction is also an underlying factor.

The changes made to the superstructures led to a raise of the center of gravity. The additional keel do not appear on the as-built plans nor on the free-board report transmitted to the administration. Generally speaking, due to the absence of draught marks (to check the trim and the actual gross weight of the vessel), the stability calculations done on board lacked of precision.

Results of the Feb. 17 loading case calculations show figures hardly at the limits of the required criteria. The intact stability of the yacht appeared inadequate to the crew when the vessel was at sea: even when the wind was moderate the list taken by the vessel was noticeable. When the master wrote the projected work list to be done in the frame of the warranty visit, he requested other inclining experiment in order to check the figures. This request had been rejected by Proteskan Turquoise project manager and suppressed from the final list of works to be done.

This intact stability situation is an underlying factor and points out vulnerability of the vessel. The damage stability analysis has been impaired by a CNSNP advice that was not acted upon, which precised that the analysis should take in consideration the case when both beach clubs would be simultaneously flooded. On the other hand, it is probable that criteria would not have been met if this analysis had considered this requirement. This had been confirmed by the inability of the vessel to right up after the list to starboard had increased.

Considering the presence of 10cm (up to 30cm or more) of water in each of the beach clubs, it appears that the vessel could not right herself. This small reserve stability had been an aggravating factor of the flooding of contiguous compartments. It had led to the foundering of the vessel when the vessel superstructure flooding spots (engine room and crew dinning room air inlets) had been submerged, when the list had been reaching about 40 degrees.

In addition, BEAmer notices that “minor breach” notion puts the vessel survival capacity at risk. The definition should comprehend the entirety of a hull division between two watertight bulkheads and not be limited to one compartment. The side doors located under the level of the free-board deck have to be watertight. The sill of the side doors was under the waterline yet the detailed plans show that the door internal lower sills, protected by a seal, were above the deep waterline (DWL).

However BEAmer observes that International Convention on Load Lines (LL66, 1988 protocol) is not referred in division 242 although it seems particularly relevant in the case of big size side doors opening to watertight compartments. Although it was not part of the planned warranty work list, the disassembly of the stern door had been difficult. These difficulties resulted in meticulous watertightness control, both in the shipyard and at sea. To remain undetected, a water leak should have begun only shortly before the engine failure, with an important flow rate. Moreover, when the height of water is higher than several dozens of centimeters, its origin cannot be identified anymore.

A tightness failure of the stern door seal is the first hypothetical factor of the flooding of Yogi.

The officers on watch had never been alerted by the flooding alarm of the steering room. Given the vessel motions and the height of water observed during the investigation, it should have gone off. This malfunction is the second hypothetical factor contributing to the flooding. The modified draining circuit of the three aft compartments constitutes a “weak link” that could have initiated the spreading of water from one compartment to the two others, through a siphon effect in case of an overflowing of the drips tank, and following the flooding of beach club 1. This malfunction constitutes a third hypothetical factor.

BEAmer observed that the crisis had been managed without unnecessary risk-taking and with cold-blood by the crew, under the master’s authority.

A response issued by Mehmet Karabeyoglu, managing director of Proteksan-Turquoise , available here.

Full report available by clicking here . French and English are in same document.

Related Posts

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has taken over the investigation of the May 18 sinking of the 90-foot expedition yacht upon its launch at…

By Dorie Cox Capt. Scott Redlhammer heard a radio call from a sinking boat near Bimini in the Bahamas on Feb. 18. Fortunately, so did…

A captain’s “reckless decision to sail into the well-forecasted path of Hurricane Sandy” was the probable cause of the sinking of a ship off the…

DriveMag Boats

Your ultimate resource for anything ship-related

New video of the sinking of superyacht Yogi emerges

Courtesy of GoPro

A new video captures the rescue of the crew members of superyacht Yogi.

Shot on GoPro cameras by the Greek Coast Guard, the video was published on GoPro's YouTube page.

The video was released five years after the sinking of Proteksan-Turquoise yacht M/Y Yogi in the Aegean Sea.

The video shows a Coast Guard officer rappeling from the helicopter to the sinking vessel.

Two Greek Air Force helicopters, a Navy frigate and four commercial ships responded to the distress call made by the crew of superyacht Yogi.

You can read more about this superyacht disaster in our dedicated article about M/Y Yogi .

The global authority in superyachting

• NEWSLETTERS
• Yachts Home
• The Superyacht Directory
• Yacht Reports
• Brokerage News
• The largest yachts in the world
• The Register
• Yacht Advice
• Yacht Design
• 12m to 24m yachts
• Monaco Yacht Show
• Builder Directory
• Designer Directory
• Interior Design Directory
• Naval Architect Directory
• Yachts for sale home
• Motor yachts
• Sailing yachts
• Explorer yachts
• Classic yachts
• Sale Broker Directory
• Charter Home
• Yachts for Charter
• Charter Destinations
• Charter Broker Directory
• Destinations Home
• Mediterranean
• South Pacific
• Rest of the World
• Boat Life Home
• Owners' Experiences
• Interiors Suppliers
• Owners' Club
• Captains' Club
• BOAT Showcase
• Boat Presents
• Events Home
• World Superyacht Awards
• Superyacht Design Festival
• Design and Innovation Awards
• Young Designer of the Year Award
• Artistry and Craft Awards
• Explorer Yachts Summit
• Ocean Talks
• The Ocean Awards
• BOAT Connect
• Between the bays
• Golf Invitational
• Boat Pro Home
• Pricing Plan
• Superyacht Insight
• Product Features
• Premium Content
• Testimonials
• Global Order Book
• Tenders & Equipment

Yogi: an exclusive look at the superyacht that sank in the Aegean Sea

In 2012 superyacht Yogi sank off Skyros, Greece when she was en route from Turkey to the Mediterranean after a warranty paint period. Before the sinking of Yogi, Boat International was given an exclusive look at the 60.2m  Proteksan Turquoise yacht.

Yogi – meaning practitioner of yoga – is Proteksan Turquoise’s largest yacht yet and affirms the yard’s intention to move into the larger section of customised superyachts. Yet this full-displacement steel and aluminium yacht does not resemble Proteksan’s previous builds. Designed by Jean Guy Verges , who has been working with Proteksan since the nineties, Yogi’s hull is quasi-expedition style and her sharp edges and straight lines are inspired by contemporary architecture. Her oversized portholes and windows bring in vast amounts of natural light and facilitate astonishing views on each of the four decks.

‘The idea,’ explains Verges, ‘was to have a yacht that could be chartered and run just like a resort, offering all you would expect in terms of leisure equipment and a pool, beach club, alfresco panoramic dining room, media and play room, as well as a wellness centre and luxury accommodation. ‘She has been designed to the specific requests of her owner,’ he adds. ‘I think this jewel offers more than you would expect of a yacht her size.’

Yogi’s layout is flowing and simple with large open spaces. Some statistics: the main saloon is more than 100 square metres; the dining room and lounge are 60 square metres; the owner’s suite is 75 and media/play lounge is 50. Needless to say, the yacht feels voluminous.

The interiors have been inspired by Balinese and Asian design, translated into a contemporary style using earthy shades and natural materials. Ceilings are finished with slate-effect panels with leather stitching, and the staircase has the same finish on its leather-panelled walls.

Details on Yogi are important: delicate touches are seen throughout, adding to the elegant yet understated effect. Fabric was supplied by high-end companies such as Nobilis, Jim Thompson and Pierre Frey with soft furnishings and lamps from Promemoria. New York-based photographer Michael Chen’s prints adorn the walls; decorative items are from Hermès Paris and there is custom furniture throughout. Guests can connect their iPhone or iPod to the centralised entertainment system, which also provides information and a vast library of music and movies for guests’ perusal.

The sun deck has an unusual layout and features a media/play lounge at the centre. Oversized windows on all sides create the feeling of floating over the sea, opening on to the aft sun deck through circular sliding doors. When the doors are open there is very much an alfresco feel for the guests who can relax in the shade on the curved sofas. Forward, up some stairs, is a raised dining area that can seat up to 14 guests. Aft, a spa pool for six is integrated into a large sun pad platform, overlooking the sea through the aft glass bulwark.

On the upper deck, the upper saloon also offers a place for dining with fantastic views: sliding doors enable guests to enjoy a formal alfresco dinner. In the saloon a five-metre sofa and comfortable armchairs continue the Zen feeling and floor-to-ceiling windows echo the design of the rest of the yacht.

Out on deck, a large sun pad with adjustable backrests provides a fantastic setting for evening movie watchers. The forward area of this deck is dedicated to the wheelhouse, finished in oak, black leather and dark grey lacquer. The captain’s and service crew cabins are also in this section, as is a pantry and service area.

The main deck is another spectacular space. There is a large pool with glass-bottomed floor, which spreads light through the water to the beach club below, while its glass overflow enhances the feeling of transparency. U-shaped sofas create an intimate space for relaxation. A set of sun pads separates the lounge and the pool area.

The main saloon is a beautifully tranquil zone. To port, a set of sofas and armchairs face a pair of chaise lounges and to starboard there is a great place to relax and read a book while feeling at the edge of the sea. Forward is the cinema area where guests can enjoy movies reclining on a four-metre custom sofa designed by JG Verges Design. The room is flooded with natural light through the 14 large floor-to-ceiling windows.

Forward is the owner’s and VIP lobby, with leather and wood marquetry walls. The VIP suite has an unusual starboard position with three floor-to-ceiling windows. The décor follows the same contemporary Asian style and features natural material such as stone, leather, oak wood, lacquer, fine silks and linen; a large en suite is reached through sliding doors.

Forward again is the owner’s private area. The full-width master has floor-to-ceiling windows, a leather and wooden desk and a chaise longue. The king-sized bed on the centreline faces a walk-in wardrobe, which provides ample storage as well as access to two en suites. To port, his has a large shower room and to starboard, hers a large bathtub and a television. The stone walls are finished with contrasting logo motifs, and natural light streams in through large windows.

Guest accommodation on the lower deck is provided in four suites –three double and one twin. Two of the cabins can be converted into one large suite by sliding back the wall panels. All have en suites finished in natural materials.

Aft, the beach club has a bar and massage room, panelled in teak, creating a warm cabana-style place to relax after a swim. A glass panel in the ceiling creates an interesting effect light into this room as light filters through the spa pool above. In many ways, Yogi challenges how superyachts are conceptually designed to be enjoyed.

Similar yachts for sale

More stories, most popular, from our partners, sponsored listings.

By SuperyachtNews 19 Feb 2013

'Yogi' sinking subject of criminal investigation

The sinking of motoryacht 'yogi' that occurred in february 2012 is now under criminal investigation, tells superyachtnews.com.….

Join the discussion

To post comments please Sign in or Register

When commenting please follow our house rules

Click here to become part of The Superyacht Group community, and join us in our mission to make this industry accessible to all, and prosperous for the long-term. We are offering access to the superyacht industry’s most comprehensive and longstanding archive of business-critical information, as well as a comprehensive, real-time superyacht fleet database, for just £10 per month, because we are One Industry with One Mission. Sign up here .

Sign up to the SuperyachtNews Bulletin

Receive unrivalled market intelligence, weekly headlines and the most relevant and insightful journalism directly to your inbox.

Sign up to the SuperyachtNews Bulletin

The superyachtnews app.

Follow us on

Media Pack Request

Please select exactly what you would like to receive from us by ticking the boxes below:

SuperyachtNews.com

Register to comment